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RHS PEOPLE V. SPRIGGS [60 C.2d 
[('rim. Xo. 7601. In Bank. Feb. 25, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaiutiff and Respondent, v. CLARENCE 
SPRIGGS, Dl·fendant and Appellant. 
[la, lb] Criminal Law-Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations Against 
Penal Interest.-In a narcotics prosecution in which defells" 
counsel, while cross-examining one of the arresting officl' 1'.'; , 
asked whether he had asked defendant's companion if the ual'-
cotics found wpre hers, and, on receiving an affirmati"e HIl-
swer, asked him what the companion said, it was rever:sibl(' 
error to refuse to allow the officer to answer on the ground 
that the question callcd for a third person's declaration against 
penal interest; such a declaration is no less trustworthy than 
declarations against pecuniary or proprietary intere"t. A per-
sou's interest agaiust being criminally implicated givcs rea-
sonahle as~;urance of the veracity of his statement made against 
that intcrcst. (Overruling People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595 [30 P. 7] 
to the ('xtcnt that it is contrary to this opinion.) 
[2] Evidence-Hearsay-Exceptions to Rule.-Code Civ. Pro"., 
~ lS4;3, providing that a witness can testify only to tho~e faets 
that he knows of his own knowledge, except in tho~e few 
('xpress cll~es in which the declarations of others are nd-
luissible, simply states the common law principle of iu-
admissibility of hearsay evidence while recognizing instances 
of admissible hearsay evidence; the types of admissible hear-
!say evidence are not confined to those enumerated in the 
statute. 
[3] Criminal Law-Evidence-Hearsay-Exceptions to Rule of 
Exclusion.-'Vhen hearsay evidcncc is admitted it is usually 
because it has a high degrcc of trustworthiness. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Hearsay-Declal'ations Against Penal Interest. 
-In a narcotics prosecution, thc admissibility of un extraju-
dicial declaration against penal interest of defendant's com-
panion did not depcnd 011 unavailability of the declarant to 
te~tify at the trial. Her unavailability would afford a basis 
for admissibility ill addition to the trustworthy charactcr of 
thc declaration, hut if she were available the credibility of 
the extrajudicial declaration would not be lm;sened; further-
ltlore, the opportunity for the cross-examination would elim-
inate the basic objection to the hearsay character of the 
evidence. 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Evidencl', §§ 378, 411; Am.Jur., Evidence 
(1st ed §§ 452, 453, 495, 561.5). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §~ 429(5), 433; [2] 
Evid('n"l', § 249; [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 433; [5] Criminal Law, 
§ 424. 
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[5] Id.-Evidence-Materiality.-In a prosecution for unlawful 
possession of narcotics, a qu!'stion asking an arresting officer 
whether defendant's companion stated that the narcotics "were 
hers" was not objectionnble for immateriality, sine!', if she 
had answered "yes," such evidence, though not conclusive, 
would have been material to the issue of possession, and 
further que~tiolls might have brought out that she meant that 
it was she who had possession. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Delbert E. 'Vong, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for unlawful possession of heroin. Judgment 
of conviction reversed. 
Herbert E. Selwyn, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and C. A. Collins, Deputy Attor-
ney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court sitting without a jury 
eOllvicted defendant of possessing heroin in violation of 
Health alld Safety Code, section 11500. He appeals from the 
judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred 
in refusing to admit certain evidence. 
The evidence is conflicting. Officer Cochran testified that 
from a darkened doorway he and two other poliee officers 
observed defendant and Mrs. Albertina Roland together on 
the street on the evening of February 17, 1962. When de-
fendant was about 40 feet from the officers, he bent over and 
placed his hand under a hedge. He withdrew his hand with a 
pieee of paper in it, looked around, again placed his hand 
under the hedge, and then stood up and began walking with 
his companion toward the officers. When they reached the 
doorway, Officer Cochran stepped out and shouted "Police 
Officer." Defendant jumped back and threw a balloon and a 
piece of paper to the ground. Officer Cochran picked up the 
balloon and paper, and observed a white powder in the bal-
loon. The officers then arrested defendant and Mrs. Roland. 
At the trial the parties stipUlated that the powder was 
heroin. 
Defendant had just been released from prison in the after-
noon of the day of the arrest. He testified that he did not 
purchase or receive narcotics from Mrs. Roland or any other 
person on that day and that he did not bend over or place his 
I 
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hand Ul1Ut'l' any hrdge, bllt did stop lIloll11'ntal'ily wllile Mrs. 
Holanu bent O\'er to fix IlPr stockillgs. \Vhen the officers ac-
costcd him thcy poked him as if tryillg to makc him gag, and 
contillued to beat him for about 10 minutes until an officer 
said that he found somdhing on thc sidewalk. Defcndallt 
tl'stified tllat he did not throw anything to the ground and 
that when hc alld Mrs. Uoland were in the police car, an 
officer statcd "One of you had this narcotics, and you are 
going to tell us which one of you had it." Officer Cochran 
tl'stified that Mrs. HoI and mlS known by the police as a user 
of narcotics. Defrndant's COUllSel cross-rxamincd Officer 
Cochran regarding Mrs. Holand's arrrst as follows: "Q. Did 
you talk to her at the time you arrested hrr? A. Yes. Q. 
Did you ask her if the narcotics that you allegedly found 
were hers? A. Yes, I did. Q. "What did she say Y" The 
prosecutor objected on the grounds of immateriality and 
hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defend-
ant did not rephrase the qurstion or make an offer of proof of 
what the expected answer might be. [la] Defendant con-
tends that the witness should have been allowed to answer 
the question on the ground that the 11earsay rule does not 
preclude admission of a declaration against penal interest. 
In 1892 this court held that a ht'arsay declaration against 
penal interest was not admissible. (People v. iIall, 94 Cal. 
595, 599 [30 P. 7] ; sec also People v. Raber, 168 Cal. 316, 319 
[143 P. 317] ; Ryan v. Bank of Italy, 106 Ca1.App. 690, 695 
[289 P. 863].) Although still the law in a majority of juris-
dictions, this rule has been yigorously criticized by the schol-
ars. (5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1476, 1477; McCor-
mick, Evidence, 549-553; McBaine, Cal. Evidence Manual, 
§ 813; Model Code of Evidence, Hule 509; Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 63(10) ; Holmes, J., dissenting in Donnelly 
v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 [33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 
820].) The traditional rule excluding hearsay declarations 
against penal interest was first established by the House of 
Lords in 1844 in the Sussex Peera{}e case, 11 Clark & F. 85. 
Dean \Vigmore points out that the Sussex case was a back-
ward step from earlier English cases admitting declarations 
against interest. (5 Wigmore, supra, § 1476.) Exclusion of 
declarations against penal interest now rests only on the his-
torical accident of the Sussex case. (See McBaine, supra, 
§ 813; 5 Wigmore, supra, § 1477.) A minority of courts, 11OW-
ever, 118ve dc-parted from the Sussex case and admit hearsay 
declarations against penal interc-st. (Hines v. Commonwealth, 
136 Va. 728 [117 S.E. 843, 846-850, 35 A.L.R. 431] [hearsay 
) 
Feb. 1964] PEOPLE V. SPRIGGS 871 
[60 C.2d 868; 36 Cal.Rptr. 841, 3S9 P.Zd 3771 
testimony of decedent's confession admitted in behalf of de-
fendant] ; Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445 [61 S.E. 
2d 318, 325-326] [third person's written confession admitted 
although he refused to testify claiming' rig'ht against self-
incrimination] ; Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282 [189 S.W.2d 
284, 289-290, 162 A.L.R. 437] [third person's affidavit 
making statements against penal interest admitted although 
he refused to testify claiming right against self-incrimina-
tion; hearsay declaration not admissible against the defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution, State v. Gordcll, 356 Mo. 1010 
[204 S.W.2d 713, 715]; but cf. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.) 
250 S.W.2d 159, 163] ; Blocker v. Statc, 55 Tex.Crim. 30 [114 
S.W. 814, 815, 131 Am.St.Rep. 772] [hearsay declaration 
admissible if prosecution's evidence solely circumstantial, I 
and it is shown that declarant might have committed the 
crime] ; People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172 [108 N.E.2d 488, 492] 
[third persoll's confession admissible where prosecution's 
sole evidence was defendant's repudiated confession]; Bren-
man v. State, 151 Md. 265 [184 A. 148, 150-151, 48 A.L.R. 
342] [hearsay declaration of paternity admitted in behalf of 
defendant prosecuted for bastard~']; Thomas v. State, 186 
Md. 446 [47 A,2d 43, 45-46 167 A.L.R. 390] [hearsay decla-
ration admissible because declarant available as a witness] ; 
see also McClain v. Anderson Free Prcss, 232 S.C. 448 [102 
S.E.2d 750, 760-762] [approving rule admitting declarations 
against penal interest, but holding evidence inadmissible 
under facts of case]; United States Y. Annunziato (2d Cir.) 
293 F.2d 373, 378 [admitting cvi(kncc on other grounds, but 
criticizing rule regarding penal interl'st]; In re Forsythe's 
Estate, 221 Minn. 303 [22 N.W.2d 19, 25, fn. 3, 167 A.L.R. 1] 
[dictum indicating admissibility of declarations against pe-
nal intercst] ; In re Winine{Jcr's Petition (Okla. Crim.App.) 
337 P.2d 445, 452-454 [dissenting opinion].) 
In 1872 the California Legislature codified many of the 
common law rules of evidence, including some of the tradi-
tional rules governing admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1825.) The codification of the hearsay 
rule has remained largely unaltered, although in some in-
stances the Legislature has added to its origmal enactment 
(e.g., Uniform Bnsinrss R('cords as Evidence Act, Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1953e-1953h). The Legislature, however, did not 
freeze the law of evidence to the rules set forth in the Code 
of Civil Procedure or other statutes. (See Holland v. Zollner, 
102 f'al. 633, 637 [36 P. 930, 37 P. 231] ; People v. Ah Sam, 
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41 Cal. 645, 653.) Numerous questiolls arise 011 which the 
Legislature has becll silent or illl'xpiieit. The eOlll·ts llllht 
answer thcsc questions and dewlop jlldieially the law of evi-
dence (People v. Cahan, 44 C'al.2d 434, 44~ [~8~ P.2d 905, 50 
A.L.R.2d 513] ; Williams v. JUdd, 170 Cal. 6~31, 649[151 P. 
1, Ann. Cas. 1916E 703]) in the light of common law prillei-
pIes and the basic objectives of the statutes. (See Dceoratit·c 
Carpets, Inc. v. State Board of Eqllali2atioll, 58 Cal.2d 2;")2, 
256 [23 Cal.Rptr. 589, 373 P.2d 637] ; Stone, The Commoll 
Law in the United States, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 4; Poulld, Conti/lim 
Law and Legislation, 21 Harv.L.Rev. 383, 388.) Thus, we 
have continued to supplement the common law of evidence as 
it was codified in 1872, restricting the admissibility of certain 
evidence (People v. Cahan, supra, at p. 445 [excluding il. 
legally obtained evidenceJ ; Sappenfield v. Main St. &; Agri-
cultural Park R. R. Co., 91 Cal. 48, 61-63 [27 P. 590] [ex. 
cluding evidence of defendant's safety measures subsequent 
to accident]; Citti v. Bam, 204 Cal. 136, 139 [266 P. 9341 
[excluding evidence of defendant's liability immranre] ; see 
Brown v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 79 Ca1.App.2d 613, 615-619 
[180 P.2d 424] [excluding evidence of plaintiff's settlemrnt 
with a third person] ; People v. Burns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 
541-542 [241 P.2d 308, 242 P.2d 9] [excluding gruesome 
photograph]), and expanding the scope of admissible evi-
dence (Johnsen v. Oakland, S.L. &: H.E. Ry., 127 Cal. 608, 
611 [60 P. 170] [admitting lay opinion of train's speed]; 
Healy v. Visalia etc. R. R. Co., 101 Cal. 583, 589-590 [36 P. 
125] [admitting passenger's opinion of effect of crash impact 
on an "ordinary person"]; Robinson v. Exempt Fire Co., 
103 Cal. 1, 4-6 [36 P. 955, 42 Am.st.Rep. 93, 24 L.R.A. 715] 
[admitting lay opinion of plaintiff's health] ; People v. Slo-
bodion, 31 Cal.2d 555, 559·560 [191 P.2d 1] [admitting extra-
judicial identification of criminal defpndant]; People 
v. Manoogian, 141 Cal. 592, 594·598 [75 P. 177] [admittin~ 
witness' observations of defendant's appearance as to his 
"being or acting rational or irrational "]; Sl'e casE'S infra 
regarding admissible hearsay evidence). 
The basis for excluding hearsay evidence in California is 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1845, which states that" A 
witnE'ss can testify of those facts only which he knows of his 
own knowledge ... except in those few express cases in which 
... the declarations of others, are admissible." The "express 
cases" referred to in section 1845 are commollly known as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The typcs of admissible hear-
Ray evidence recognized in the common law in 1872 were then 
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codified in the Code of Civil Proerdure. (Code Civ. Proe., 
§§ 18-!9, 1850, 1852, 1853, 1870, 1901, 1905, 1920, 1945, 1946.) 
[2] Section 1845, however, simply states the common law 
principle of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence while recog-
nizing instances of admissible hearsay evidence. The types of 
admissible hearsay evidence are not confined to those enumer-
ated in the statute. Building on the basic principles of the 
rules of evidence as codified in 1872 other "express cases" 
have been evolved judicially. 
Thus, this court developed the rule that admits hearsay 
declarations to show the state of mind of the declarant, both 
at the time of and before the declaration (Adkins v. Brett, 
184 Cal. 252, 255-256 [193 P. 251]; Estate of Carson, 184 
Cal. 437, 445 [194 P. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239] ; Cripe v. Cripe, 170 
Cal. 91, 93 [148 P. 520] ; Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal.2d 523, 
524-525 [127 P.2d 530J ; Williams v. ](idd, 170 Cal. 631, 648-
652 [151 P. 1, Ann. Cas. 1916E 703]) ; the rule that admits 
hearsay declarations to establish the future conduct of the 
declarant (People v. Selby, 198 Cal. 426, 430 (245 P. 426] ; 
Benjamin v. District Grand Lodge No.4, 171 Cal. 260, 266-
267 (152 P. 7311 ; People v. Wright, 167 Cal. 1, 8 [138 P. 
349]; Union Oil 00. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149, 157-158 [110 P. 
313, Ann. Cas. 1912A 567] ; see People v. lllerkouris, 52 Cal. 
2d 672, 682 [344 P.2d 1] ; People v. Alcalde, 24 Ca1.2d 177, 
185-188 [148 P.2d 627]) ; the rule that admits hearsay decla-
rations to show the past knowledge of the declarant (People 
v. One 1948 Chevrolet ContI. Coupe, 45 Cal.2d 613, 620-622 
[290 P.2d 538, 55 A.L.R.2d 1272]); the rule that admits 
hearsay testimony of spontaneous or excited utterances re-
gardless of their contemporaneousness with a "transaction in 
issue"{Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Ca1.2d 575, 581-
582 [160 P.2d 211 ; ShOll'Olter v. lV estern Pac. R. R. Co., 16 
Cal.2d 460, 465-470 [106 P.2d R95] ; see Foster v. Pestana, 77 
Cal.App.2d 885, 888-889 (177 P.2d 54] ; see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1850); and the rule that admits hearsay declarations of 
pain or suffering (Bloomberg v. Laventhal, 179 Cal. 616, 619-
620 [178 P. 496] ; Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 393 (47 
P. 139] ; sec n'illiams v. A .. R.G. Bus Co., 47 Ca1.App. 568,570 
[190 P. 1036]), and of bodily condition (People v. Brown, 49 
Ca1.2d 577, 585-587 [320 P.2d 5] ; Peoplc v. Wright, 167 Cal. 
1, 8 [138 P. 3491 ; sec People v. Thomas, 51 Cal.App. 731, 73G-
736 [197 P. 677]). 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1853, section 1870, subdi-
vision 4, and section 1946, subdivision 1, contain piecemeal 
) 
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statements of the COlllllltJll law rule (Hllllitting lll'arsay decla-
rations against intert'st.i Here again we have gone beyond 
the 1872 codifit'ation. IIl'arsay declarations against interest 
are admissible against a party not the decedent's successor in 
interest, even though not made against the declarant's inter-
est ill real propert.'-. (Ellla!! v. Pacific Empluycrs II/.~. Co., 8 
Cal.2d 66a, 673-674 [Gi P.2d 10-16] ; Sl'l' Jla!!ficld v. FidcZity 
&; Cas. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 611, 617 [61 P.2d 83] ; compare 
Code Civ. Proe., §§ 1853 and 1870, subd. 4.) We have also 
admitted hearsay dee1aratiolls against interest when the 
declarant is neither deceased nor otherwise unavailable. 
(Emery v. Pacific EII/ployers IllS. Co., supra, at pp. 673-674.) 
'fhe statutes do not exclude hearsay delcarations against 
penal interest. Their admissibility must therefore be deter-
minl'd in the light of the principle tlJat "the purpose of all 
rules of l'videnee is to aid in arriving at the truth, [and] if it 
shall appear that any rule tends rather to hinder than to 
facilitate this result ... it should be abrogatl,d without hesita-
tion." (Williams v. Ki(Zcl, 170 Cal. 631, 649 [151 P. 1, Ann. 
Cas. 1916E 703].) 
[3] ,Yhen hearsay evidence is admitted it is usually be-
cause it has a high dl'gree of trustworthiness. (Lane v. Pa-
c1:fic Greyhound Lines, 26 Ca1.2d 575, 582 [160 P.2d 21]; 
Mayfield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 611, 617 [61 
P.2d 83); 5 Wigmore, supra, § 1420.) Thus, declarations 
against pecuniary or proprietary intereSlt are admitted be-
cause they are unlikely to he false. (5 ·Wigmore, supra, 
§§ 1457-1475.) [lb] A declaration agaillst penal illtcrest is 
IlO less trustworthy. As we pointl'd Ollt in People v. One 19 f8 
Chcvrolet C01ll'. Coupe, 45 Ca1.2d 613, 622 [290 P.2cl 538, 55 
A.L.R.2d 1272], a person's interest against being criminally 
implicated ~iws reasonable aSSlurance of the veracity of his 
statement made against that interest. :Moreover, since the 
ISection 18."33 reads: "The <1celaration, act, or omission of a decedent, 
having sufficient knowledge of the subject, against his pecuniary interest, 
is also adll1i~sible as evidence to that extent against his successor in 
interest. " 
Section 18iO, s1Ib,1. -1 reads: "In conformity with the precetling pro-
visions, evidence may he given upon a trial of the following facts: 
... 4 ... the act or declaration of a deceased person done or made 
ngainst his intercst in rc·'pect to his real property .... " 
Section 1!l-16, subd. 1 reads: "The entries :md other writings of a 
,h,cedent, made at or ncar the time of the transaction, and in a position 
to know the facts stated therein, may be reall as prima facie evidence of 
the facts stated therein, in the following cases: 1. When the entry was 
made against the interest of thepersoll making it .••• " 
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conyidioll of a crime ordinarily entails economic loss, thc 
traditional concept of a "pecuniary interest" could logically 
include one's "penal interest." (Comparc the theory that 
admit~ a third person's confpssion of a crimc on the ground 
that the crime was also a tort, thus subjecting the deelarant 
to civil liability for damages, a pecuniary interest. E.g., 
Webcr \'. Chicago R. I. & P. By. Co., 175 Iowa 358 [131 N.W. 
852, 864, L.R.A. 1918A 92G J ; :MeCormick, supra, § 255, p. 
549.) We llave concluded, therefore, that the ruling of the 
trial court was erroneous insofar as it excludes hearsay 
declarations against penal interest. To the rxtent that it is 
contrary to this opinion, People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595 [30 P. 7] 
is overruled. 
[4] The question remains whether the admissibility of 
hearsay declarations against interest depends on the una\'ail-
ability of the declarant to testify at the triaP If Mrs. Ro-
land was deceased, insane, suffering from severe illncss, 
absent from the jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable as a 
witncss,S such unavailability providpd a necessity for the evi-
dent'e, thus affording a basis for its admissibility in addition 
to the trustworthy character of the declaration. (See 5 Wig-
morc, supra, §§ 1420, 1421, 1456; McCormick, supra, 546, 
554.) If she was available, however, the credibility of her 
pxtrajudit'ial statf'mcllts would not be lessened by that fact. 
Furthermore, the opportunity for cross-examination would 
eliminate the basic objection to the lJearsay character of the 
Hidencl'. (See People v. Gould, 34 Ca1.2d 621, 626-627 [7 
Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 8G5]; McCormick, supra, § 39, p. 74; 
5 Wigmore, supra, § 13G2 ; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the 
App7ication of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192-
193.) Thus if :nIl'S. Roland had taken the witness stand and 
denied possession of the narcotics, her out-of-court declara-
tion against interest would have been admissible to prove the 
truth of the matter stated (spe EII/CI'!} v. Pacific EI1lI)loycl's 
Ins. Co., sllpra, at pp. 673-G74 ; Thol/las v. State, 186 Md. 446 
[47 A.2d 43, 45-46, IG7 A.L.R. 390] ; McCormick, supra, 554; 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, RulC' 63 (10) ; Model Code of 
Evidence, Rule 509; see also Dodd v. Cantwell, 179 Cal.App. 
2d 727, 732 [4 Ca1.Rptr. 113]; Mayfield v. Fidelity &: Cas. 
2The record does not disclose whether or not Mrs. Roland was avail· 
ahle as a witness. 
3If :\{rs. Roland had talH'n the witness stand, but refused to testify 
reg-ar,ling posSl'ssioll of nar<'otics, invoking her constitutional right not 
to incriminate herself, she would not have been availaLle as a witness. 
) 
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Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 611, 617 [61 P.2d 83]) as well as to 
impeach her by a prior ineon!>i!>tent statement (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 2049,2032).4 Thus, in the event of a retrial, drfensp 
counsel should bc allowed to ask Officer Coehran the qnpstioll 
objected to, whether or not the unavailability of Mrs. Roland 
is established. 
[5] There is no merit to the contention that regardl('ss of 
the hearsay issue the question was proprrly objected to for 
immateriality. The Attorney Gen('ral contends that the ques-
tion sought to establish own('rship of the narcotics, and not 
possession, which is all that is needed for a violation of the 
statute. The question was whether Mrs. Roland stated that 
the narcotics "were hers." If she answered "yes," such 
evidence, although not conclusive, would clearly be material 
to the issue of possession. Had the officer been allowed to 
answer the question, further questions might have brought 
out that she m('ant that it was she who had possession. The 
hearsay objection, however, blocked further inquiry. Since 
the trial judge correctly applied the then existing law on the 
hearsay issue, rephrasing the question or making an offer of 
proof would have been fruitless. Defendant is ther('fore not 
precluded from raising the hearsay issue on appeal. (See 
People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal.2d 260, 262-263 [294 1'.2d 17].) 
Denying defendant the opportunity to establish that Mrs. 
Roland admitted possession of the heroin was prejudicial to 
him. 'With such an admission before it. there is a reasonabl( 
probability that the trial court would have believed defend-
ant's testimony and would have concluded that the officer 
was mistaken and that it was Mrs. Roland, not defendant, 
who threw the heroin to the ground at the time of the arrest. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and 
Peek, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment. See 
the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice \Vood for the 
District Court of Appeal in Peoplc v. Spriggs (Cal.App.) 33 
Cal.Rptr. 732. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 
25, 1964. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
4Tbe declaration would also be admissible in a proRecution against 
'Mrs. Roland as an admission of a party opponcnt. (Codc Civ. Proc. 
§ 1870, subd. 2; People v. Wilkins, 1G8 Cal. 530 [111 P. 612J.) 
